u At each epoch t = 1, 2, …, T, arm i generates reward r i,t ~i .i.d. N(µ i ,σ)
• σ : known, same across arms.
• {µ 1 , µ 2 , …, µ n }: unknown but maximum and minimum possible values {µ min , µ max }, hence R µ = µ max -µ min : known.
u At each t, agent j makes (in general) two-step decision:
I. Reward Collection vs
Communication: Should it broadcast message: (arm it pulled at t -1, reward it collected)?
• (Opportunity) Cost: Cannot pull arm to collect reward at t.
• Benefit: Message available to entire team at t + 1 for decision-making.
II. Exploration vs exploitation: If it
decides not to broadcast, which arm should it pull?
∀i, t;
Motivation: Development and solution of a model for ad hoc teamwork [3, 5] wherein a population of robotic or software agents works cooperatively towards a common goal without pre-coordination and with expensive communication. u Goal: Maximize horizon-T cumulative reward of the team u This MWU algorithm is equivalent to decreasing Softmax [6] strategy over empirical means with temperature
Theorem. In a centralized, finite-horizon, multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem, the public agent uses an MWU approach to assign arms to agents as above, with parameters for 0 < δ < min{2nTΦ(R µ /2σ),1}, where Φ(.) is the standard normal CDF, then with probability at least (1 -δ),
Experiments
For each agent j, each epoch t is either an action round or a broadcast round, t = 1 being an action round for every agent.
Action round
• Combine private table with public agent to compute private empirical means where
• Apply decreasing Softmax with temperature schedule as in (1) to generate probability distribution over arms.
• Draw an arm from above distribution; collect reward and add to team's cumulative reward; update private table.
• Decide whether next epoch is action round or broadcast round by VoI strategy shown in Flowchart 1 on the right.
Broadcast round
• Send out public message consisting of arm pulled in previous epoch and reward obtained from it.
• Pull no arm in this epoch.
• Set next epoch as action round.
u "Public agent": shared representation of all information publicly communicated by the team until previous epoch; at the end of each t, updates itself with all messages received (if any), discarding duplicates; contains, for each arm i, i. Number of distinct broadcasts:
ii. Sum of corresponding rewards:
Public empirical means:
u Each agent j also has private table containing, for each arm i, i. Number of times i has pulled arm j: ii. Sum of rewards gained by i from above pulls: iii. Number of pulls among the above that i has broadcast: iv. Sum of rewards from arm j corresponding to above broadcast pulls: 
II. (t + 1) is a broadcast round:
Assume public agent uses distribution to allocate arms to remaining (m -1) agents at (t + 1), after which it augments itself with only agent j's message, and henceforth uses updated weights
VoI < 0?
Simple communication strategy:
Estimate #agents that have pulled arm i* in this epoch:
If Set (t + 1) as broadcast round. Else Draw If β = 1, Set (t + 1) as broadcast round. Else Set (t + 1) as action round.
.
• Bandit parameters: µ max = µ 1 = 1; µ min = µ n = 0.05; σ = 0.1.
• We study dependence of per-agent time-averaged regret with respect to µ 1 for a team with m = 25n agents, averaged over N sim = 10 5 repetitions, on (Set 1) Number of arms n for fixed horizon T = 500. [2] , for Set 1 only; § Non-communicating agents all playing UCB1-Normal [1] , for Set 1 only; Both sets demonstrate improvement in performance by including communication (although expensive) in general, and VoI in particular. Future work: Analysis to prove that our method converges to centralized benchmark at a reasonable rate. 
Conclusion

Flowchart 1. VoI communication strategy
Employed at the end of epoch t by agent j for which it is an action round; takes (error) parameter that is used to compute upper and lower confidence bounds on mean rewards: 
